Smoke Screen: A Theoretical Framework

Harris Delles and Vally Koubi

Public Choice, 1994, vol. 78, issue 3-4, 58 pages

Abstract: The authors develop a theory of smoke screening (ambiguity) as a means of maximizing political support when the voters' evaluation of a candidate depends on the quality of information they receive, on their ability to obtain and process relevant information, and finally on the candidate's popularity (goodness of reputation). They show that the more favorable a candidate's standing relative to his competence, the greater the incentive to milk good reputation by generating smoke screens; and that the more 'savvy' (educated, knowledgeable, involved, etc.) the public, the lower the amount of smoke screening activities undertaken. Copyright 1994 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Date: 1994
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