The political economy of patronal groups

Gerald Garvey

Public Choice, 1969, vol. 7, issue 1, 33-45

Abstract: Patronal groups represent a significant category of social organization; they are worthy and even necessary subjects of social science theory, and will require for adequate analysis models which address aspects and institutions of social life that seem inherently unstable, or at least that do not lend themselves to the kind of equilibrium theories now so prominent in studies of group action. Though the patronal group presents problems apparently having to strictly determined analytical solutions (See Section III above), certain suggestive concepts and hypotheses nevertheless emerge. These look to fruitful lines of inquiry, and to a better understanding of such groups. First, there is the notion of “achievement of equity” in burden-sharing through enforced taxation as a specific purpose of group action, theoretically separable from other group goals, such as production of some group good. And, from the foregoing analysis of this notion, are the two core hypotheses presented in this paper: that patronal groups tend to repeat essentially self-defeating cycles of increasing and decreasing taxes and budgets unless this tendency is consiciously inhibited by adoption of an “unnecessarily” high tax level; and — a related but separate hypothesis — that there exists no “optimum” or equilibrium budget or tax level in any aggregate which approximates to the ideal type of a patronal group. In suggesting these new lines of thought, as well as the “patron-protege concept” from whose analysis they emerge, it is hoped that this paper represents a contribution to group theory which recognizes and uses, but at the same time goes beyond, the equilibrium concept. Copyright Center for Study of Public Choice Virginia Polytechnic Institute 1969

Date: 1969
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DOI: 10.1007/BF01718732

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