Cultural Institutions and Value Formation on the Art Market: A Rent-Seeking Approach

Gianfranco Mossetto

Public Choice, 1994, vol. 81, issue 1-2, 125-35

Abstract: The formation of value in the artistic market can be specifically affected by the behavior of cultural institutions, acting on it as monopolistic quality certifiers. The rent-maximizing strategy limits quantities to sub-optimum levels and keeps prices and costs higher. This can be worsened by institutional rent-seeking. The establishment's strategies cannot always be matched through public policies because this can result in an increase of monopoly social losses and of the establishment's lobbying efforts. Copyright 1994 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Date: 1994
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