The First Word and the Last Word in the Budgetary Process: A Comparative Institutional Analysis of Proposal and Veto Authorities

James Dearden () and David Schap

Public Choice, 1994, vol. 81, issue 1-2, 35-53

Abstract: This study examines the role of proposal authority and executive veto in the budgetary process. A five-stage sequential model of the budgetary process with three institutional actors--a legislature, an appropriations committee, and an executive--is presented. The authors examine (1) the factors that affect the executive's power in shaping the final budget when the executive is granted proposal authority; (2) how increased veto authority, in combination with executive proposal authority, affects the executive's power in forming the final budget; and (3) the effects of different types of proposal authority and veto rules on the efficiency of the budgetary process. Copyright 1994 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Date: 1994
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