Tax Enforcement: A Public Choice Perspective

William J Hunter and Michael Nelson

Public Choice, 1995, vol. 82, issue 1-2, 53-67

Abstract: Federal income tax enforcement varies greatly across individual states. While it is not known if this interstate variation enhances efficiency, anecdotal evidence suggests it does not. In this paper, the authors apply the model of B. R. Weingast and M. Moran (1983) to the treasury and explore the relationship between the legislature and the IRS. Specifically, they model IRS audit rates by state as a function of both political and efficiency considerations. The authors find that the interstate difference in enforcement is influenced by efficiency considerations but also the IRS shifts enforcement away from states represented by legislators who sit on committees with oversight responsibility for the IRS. Copyright 1995 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Date: 1995
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