Institutional Arrangements and the Quality of Publicly Provided Goods: A Tentative Note

Jurg Schimmelpfennig

Public Choice, 1995, vol. 85, issue 1-2, 119-26

Abstract: There are considerable differences in the quality of publicly provided goods. A simple model is presented to explain these observations by differences in institutional arrangements without having to rely on eventual differences in the relative preferences of bureaucrats and politicians. Copyright 1995 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Date: 1995
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