A Probit Analysis of the Senate Vote on Gramm-Rudman

Robert E Lloyd and Joseph P McGarrity

Public Choice, 1995, vol. 85, issue 1-2, 90 pages

Abstract: The Leviathan theory of government was seemingly contradicted when the U.S. Congress passed the Gramm-Rudman deficit reduction law. This study analyzes the Senate vote on Gramm-Rudman to try to determine whether legislators acted in their own self-interest. A prisoner's dilemma argument explains how Senators made themselves better-off by limiting their own spending abilities. A probit analysis shows how voting for deficit reduction was consistent with the personal incentives faced by individual legislators. The eventual failure of Gramm-Rudman to eliminate the deficit reveals a need to consider institutional as well as constitutional means of controlling government. Copyright 1995 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Date: 1995
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