The Public Choice of "Superior" Sanctions

Zane Spindler

Public Choice, 1995, vol. 85, issue 3-4, 205-26

Abstract: This paper analyzes the public choice of specific forms of sanctions. Current sanctions are essentially quantity constraints ('Q-sanctions') which are like quotas in that they might bestow benefits on certain special interest groups in the target country. Revenue sanctions ('R-sanctions') may be able to recapture such benefits in the form of sender government revenue which could either compensate for the costs of sanctions to the sending country or finance other sanction enhancing activities aimed at the target country. Hence, R-sanctions may be 'superior' to Q-Sanctions in general or on the basis of 'target efficiency'. However, public choice analysis suggests that Q-sanctions will generally be chosen over R-sanctions by democratic countries. Copyright 1995 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Date: 1995
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