The Stability of International Coalitions in United Nations Voting from 1946 to 1973

Randall Holcombe and Russell Sobel

Public Choice, 1996, vol. 86, issue 1-2, 17-34

Abstract: The stability of outcomes under democratic decision-making is a significant issue in public choice. Several factors might make U.N. voting blocs less stable than blocs in national legislatures. Nevertheless, the data suggest that, from 1946 to 1973, United Nations voting blocs were relatively stable. Nations that leave their blocs tend to vote with nearby blocs, rather than making large ideological shifts, and tend to return to their old blocs. There does not appear to be cycles in United Nations voting blocs. Furthermore, the blocs can be ranked on a stable single-dimensioned continuum, lending further evidence that United Nations voting blocs are stable. Copyright 1996 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Date: 1996
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