An Examination of the Structure of Governance in California School Districts before and after Proposition 13

Thomas Downes

Public Choice, 1996, vol. 86, issue 3-4, 279-307

Abstract: This paper explores the structure of governance in California school districts. Two alternative models are considered--the decisive voter (benevolent dictator) model and a model that allows for rent-seeking behavior on the part of district decisionmakers. A formal test between these two models is proposed and implemented. The decisive voter model is found wanting as an explanation of school district decision making both before and after the passage of Proposition 13. There is, however, some evidence that the constraints imposed on some districts by Proposition 13 have forced decisionmakers to act in a manner more consistent with the preferences of their constituents. Copyright 1996 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Date: 1996
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:86:y:1996:i:3-4:p:279-307

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