Rents from In-Kind Subsidy: "Charity" in the Public Sector

Philip R Jones

Public Choice, 1996, vol. 86, issue 3-4, 359-78

Abstract: Public choice analysis usually focuses attention on the behavior of self-interested individuals but this paper considers rent seeking when some taxpayers are motivated by altruism. Redistribution policies initiated by self-interested rent seekers require taxpayer approval. Even if taxpayers are fully informed, their resistance to inefficient schemes is reduced when public-sector schemes are the only means available to pursue altruistic goals. Altruism serves to broaden the scope within which rent seekers may operate. A discussion of international 'tied' aid illustrates the impact which rent seeking can exert on public-sector 'charity.' Copyright 1996 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Date: 1996
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:86:y:1996:i:3-4:p:359-78

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... ce/journal/11127/PS2

Access Statistics for this article

Public Choice is currently edited by WIlliam F. Shughart II

More articles in Public Choice from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().