Electoral Equilibria with Entry: Some Simulations

Bruce Bender and Timothy C Haas

Public Choice, 1996, vol. 87, issue 3-4, 303-14

Abstract: The objective of this paper is to investigate by means of simulation the impact of third-party entry on the spatial separation of candidates. Specifically, the authors do real-time simulations of T. R. Palfrey's (1984) model of electoral equilibria with entry after relaxing some of its assumptions. Their finding that the threat of third-party entry can induce virtually the same spatial separation of the majority-party candidates as entry with certainty is both a strong and interesting result. Copyright 1996 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Date: 1996
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:87:y:1996:i:3-4:p:303-14

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