 Agent Heterogeneity and Consensual Decision Making on the Federal Open Market CommitteeGeorge A Krause Public Choice, 1996, vol. 88, issue 1-2, 83-101 Abstract: The consensual aspects of decision making are essential for understanding policy made by administrative organizations that take the form of a commission or board. Consensual decision making reflects the degree of policy cohesion exhibited by high-level officials within administrative organizations. It is proposed here that this type of behavior may differ between heterogeneous agents. The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) of the Federal Reserve System serves as a salient setting for testing these propositions in a time series context. The empirical results indicate that major intra-institutional differences exist between Board of Governor (BOG) and Regional (RBP) members of the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) regarding consensual behavior. In terms of policy decision making, the econometric evidence clearly demonstrates that the consensual behavior of these agents are fundamentally different from one another. This in turn has important implications for the study of other commission and board policy making bodies that consist of agents who are not all homogeneous. Copyright 1996 by Kluwer Academic Publishers Date: 1996 There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:88:y:1996:i:1-2:p:83-101 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from Access Statistics for this article Public Choice is currently edited by WIlliam F. Shughart II More articles in Public Choice from Springer |
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