A Mathematical One-Man One-Vote Rationale for Madisonian Presidential Voting Based on Maximum Individual Voting Power

A Natapoff

Public Choice, 1996, vol. 88, issue 3-4, 259-73

Abstract: The one-man one-vote criterion is defined formally to demand (1) maximum and equal voting power over the final outcome for each individual voter, and (2) equal power-per-vote for all groups of voters. The author shows that if it allotted representative votes on a popular-vote-cast (rather than on the present census) basis, the Madisonian Electoral College system would assure individual voters the largest possible total power available to a 'simple' system. This popular-vote basis modification would relieve the present electoral impotence of voters in poorly contested states without disturbing the voting power now enjoyed in closely contested states. Copyright 1996 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Date: 1996
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