To Fight or Not to Fight? An Analysis of Submission, Struggle, and the Design of Contests

Achim Korber and Martin Kolmar ()

Public Choice, 1996, vol. 88, issue 3-4, 92 pages

Abstract: This paper considers the players' behavior in an asymmetric two-player contest. When do they decide to struggle and when to subjugate? Analyzing contest-success functions it is found that two crucial prerequisites for struggle or war have to be met. Thus, such an equilibrium is possible but restrictive. If a self-interested rule-setter chooses the contest-success function endogenously, the authors show that one player will always subjugate. Applications to rent-seeking and environmental regulation are discussed. Copyright 1996 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Date: 1996
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:88:y:1996:i:3-4:p:381-92

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... ce/journal/11127/PS2

Access Statistics for this article

Public Choice is currently edited by WIlliam F. Shughart II

More articles in Public Choice from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().