Implementation of the Thompson Mechanism

Martin J Bailey

Public Choice, 1996, vol. 89, issue 3-4, 43 pages

Abstract: This paper reconsiders the largely overlooked Thompson insurance mechanism for public choice. The mechanism's apparent defects can be remedied by a multipart mechanism that generates necessary information and corrects potential errors. The added parts are (1) a sample of the population of eligible voters, who prepare a program for all voters' approval, and (2) the Vickrey-Clark-Groves pivot mechanism. One can use classical statistical methods to draw valid inferences from a population sample about the entire electorate, preserving incentive compatibility and permitting efficient outcomes. Copyright 1996 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Date: 1996
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