The Political Economy of Taking and Just Compensation

Fred G Esposto

Public Choice, 1996, vol. 89, issue 3-4, 267-82

Abstract: By creating an implicit right to judicial review and lowering the transaction costs a property owner must incur to challenge a taking, the just compensation restriction on eminent domain limits the tendency of political decision makers to avoid the subjective costs their actions inflict on property owners and moves the level of taking closer to the social optimum. Its impact, however, is partially to completely erased by the risk aversion of the property owner and the fiscal illusion of the political decision maker, unless there are additional constraints in the fiscal constitution. Copyright 1996 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Date: 1996
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