Involuntary Defection in Two-Level Games

Keisuke Iida

Public Choice, 1996, vol. 89, issue 3-4, 283-303

Abstract: Ratification failures are prevalent in international relations but, due to the assumption of unitary actors in international relations theory, theoretical analysis has been underdeveloped. In formalizing R. D. Putnam's metaphor of two-level games, this article shows that incomplete information about the preferences of domestic actors is crucial for understanding ratification failures. Furthermore, institutional mechanisms affect bargaining outcomes through their impact on information revelation. In particular, it is found that two-sided constraints lead to relatively equitable bargaining outcomes and that renegotiation and prenegotiation poll-taking can induce strategic voting by domestic constituents, thereby exacerbating domestic constraints. Copyright 1996 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Date: 1996
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