The Olson Ratio and Indirectly Endogenous Rent

Raul Fabella

Public Choice, 1996, vol. 89, issue 3-4, 325-37

Abstract: The author considers an economy where the rent value depends indirectly on value-adding investment of agents (thus indirectly endogenous) and the win-probability is a function of rent seeking spending. He introduces the Olson ratio, characterizes it at symmetric Cournot-Nash equilibrium of a perfectly discriminating contest, and relates it to the Tullock dissipation rate. The author investigates the possibility of black holes. Copyright 1996 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Date: 1996
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