Marginal Cost Sharing and the Articles of Confederation

Keith L Dougherty and Michael J G Cain

Public Choice, 1997, vol. 90, issue 1-4, 13 pages

Abstract: Between 1781 and 1789 the American states attempted to share the costs of national, public goods through a system of requisitions. This paper uses a simple public goods analysis to show why rational states would not share costs as intended by the Articles of Confederation. This normative argument illustrates a potential flaw in the constitutional design of the Articles and provides insight into the decline of the American Confederation. Copyright 1997 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Date: 1997
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