Toward a New Constitution for a Future Country

Martin J Bailey

Public Choice, 1997, vol. 90, issue 1-4, 73-115

Abstract: This paper outlines a preliminary radical plan for a constitution based primarily on recent contributions on mechanisms for choice of public goods and on constitutional rules and concepts, but based also on experience with present constitutions, corporate charters, and private arbitration procedures. It uses the standard economic perspective, disregarding such motives as herd instincts and the desire to serve the public interest. The result is markedly different from existing constitutions. Copyright 1997 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Date: 1997
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://journals.kluweronline.com/issn/0048-5829/contents link to full text (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:90:y:1997:i:1-4:p:73-115

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... ce/journal/11127/PS2

Access Statistics for this article

Public Choice is currently edited by WIlliam F. Shughart II

More articles in Public Choice from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().