How Some Rules Just Don't Matter: The Regulation of Lobbyists

David Lowery and Virginia Gray

Public Choice, 1997, vol. 91, issue 2, 139-47

Abstract: M. F. Brinig, R. G. Holcombe, and L. Schwartzstein (1993) have argued recently that lobby regulation restricts entry into the population of lobbying organizations and that the number of lobbying organizations then influences legislative activity. However, they analyze only the relationship between the restrictiveness of lobby regulation and legislative activity, thereby assuming that regulation actually reduces numbers of registered interest organizations. The authors test this assumption with data on state interest organization populations and find little support for it. They consider several other explanations and comment more generally on the status of institutions and their rules in the study of political phenomena. Copyright 1997 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Date: 1997
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