Choosing among Signalling Equilibria in Lobbying Games: A Reply to Sloof

Eric Rasmusen ()

Public Choice, 1997, vol. 91, issue 2, 209-14

Abstract: Randolph Sloof (1997) has written a comment on the lobbying-as-signaling model in Rasmusen (1993) in which he points out an equilibrium the author missed and criticizes the author's emphasis on a particular separating equilibrium. In this response, the author discusses how to interpret multiple equilibria in games and how to interpret mixed strategy equilibria in which two types of player with identical incentives must pick different mixing probabilities. Copyright 1997 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Date: 1997
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://journals.kluweronline.com/issn/0048-5829/contents link to full text (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:91:y:1997:i:2:p:209-14

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... ce/journal/11127/PS2

Access Statistics for this article

Public Choice is currently edited by WIlliam F. Shughart II

More articles in Public Choice from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().