Politics and the Pursuit of Fame

Tyler Cowen and Daniel Sutter

Public Choice, 1997, vol. 93, issue 1-2, 19-35

Abstract: Humans strive after fame, especially in politics. The authors construct a model in which the executive is motivated by fame as well as the desire to hold office. The fame of an executive is based on his or her achievements relative to all prior executives. Periods of great uncertainty for a nation make politicians more likely to pursue fame rather than reelection. The authors show that fame incentives weaken as a country ages. If politicians are wiser than the median voter, then the pursuit of fame by politicians improves welfare and the diminution of fame incentives over time causes national decline. Copyright 1997 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Date: 1997
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