Majority rule and the public provision of a private good

Miguel Gouveia

Public Choice, 1997, vol. 93, issue 3, 244 pages

Abstract: This paper extends the literature on the socialization of commodities by developing a model of voting over the public provision of a private good: health care. The private use of health care is modeled as a supplement rather than as an exclusive alternative to public health care. A majority rule equilibrium is shown to exist. The equilibrium characterization is an example of Director's Law of Income Redistribution. A ban on private health care activities is shown to be opposed by a majority of voters. Implications for the size and distribution of private health care expenditures are drawn. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1997

Date: 1997
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DOI: 10.1023/A:1017929005280

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