The economics of political campaign finance: FECA and the puzzle of the not very greedy grandfathers

Jeffrey Milyo

Public Choice, 1997, vol. 93, issue 3, 245-270

Abstract: This paper introduces a structural model of campaign finance which permits estimation of the marginal costs of raising money as well as the marginal benefits of spending and saving money. The model is estimated for the 1986 through 1990 election cycles; the results demonstrate that the probability of retirement hinders an incumbent's ability to raise money and that incumbents willingly trade off electoral security for financial gain. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1997

Date: 1997
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Journal Article: The Economics of Political Campaign Finance: FECA and the Puzzle of the Not Very Greedy Grandfathers (1997)
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DOI: 10.1023/A:1017972127133

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