A comparison of rent-seeking models and economic models of conflict

Hugh Neary

Public Choice, 1997, vol. 93, issue 3, 373-388

Abstract: This paper provides a comparative analysis of the basic rent-seeking model and a simple economic model of conflict. Each model is concerned with a game in which players invest resources in pursuit of a prize. The purpose of the analysis is to elucidate structural differences between the two models, and to analyse the consequent behavioral differences and equilibrium outcomes in the two cases. A key finding is that, where such comparisons are possible, the conflict model tends to involve greater relative expenditure on wealth-redistribution activities than does the rent-seeking model. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1997

Date: 1997
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DOI: 10.1023/A:1017901524758

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