Why join the party in a one-party system?: Popularity versus political exchange

Adi Schnytzer and Janez Šušteršič

Public Choice, 1998, vol. 94, issue 1, 117-134

Abstract: The paper investigates empirically the determinants of political stability in one-party states, taking as an example socialist Yugoslavia. We assume that the number of the Party members is an indicator of the stability of the regime and perform a time series analysis for the six Yugoslav republics in the 1953–1988 period. We find that rents distributed to the population were far more important than the popularity of economic policies and perhaps even more important than repression. These findings provide strong empirical support for economic models of dictatorship based on the notion of political exchange. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1998

Date: 1998
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1023/A:1004917324845 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
Journal Article: Why Join the Party in a One-Party System?: Popularity versus Political Exchange (1998)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:94:y:1998:i:1:p:117-134

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... ce/journal/11127/PS2

DOI: 10.1023/A:1004917324845

Access Statistics for this article

Public Choice is currently edited by WIlliam F. Shughart II

More articles in Public Choice from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().