Rent dissipation and efficiency in a contest with asymmetric valuations

Terrance Hurley

Public Choice, 1998, vol. 94, issue 3, 289-298

Abstract: This paper introduces contest efficiency as an alternative to rent dissipation when measuring efficiency in a contest with asymmetric valuations. Contest efficiency is defined as the expected proportion of the maximum obtainable benefit captured by the contest, and differs from rent dissipation because it values the expected winner of the contest. Therefore, rent dissipation and contest efficiency may suggest contradictory conclusions when agents have asymmetric valuations. This result is illustrated when comparing alternative equilibria in contests with asymmetric reimbursement and when analyzing the comparative static effect of a change in the relative benefit of two agents in a Cournot-Nash contest. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1998

Date: 1998
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Journal Article: Rent Dissipation and Efficiency in a Contest with Asymmetric Valuations (1998)
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DOI: 10.1023/A:1017902030135

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