How to gerrymander: A formal analysis

Katerina Sherstyuk

Public Choice, 1998, vol. 95, issue 1, 27-49

Abstract: The paper combines the optimal gerrymandering approach in political science with the “fair cake division” results in mathematics and economics to consider optimal partisan gerrymandering schemes on a given territory. We analyze existence and properties of an optimal districting map for a strategic party that has control over redistricting process, given arbitrary continuous distributions of voters and party supporters over the electoral territory. Interestingly, we find that imposition of certain equality-type constraints on districting might often help to prevent gerrymandering and sustain fairness. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1998

Date: 1998
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Related works:
Journal Article: How to Gerrymander: A Formal Analysis (1998)
Working Paper: How to Gerrymander: A Formal Analysis (1995)
Working Paper: How to Gerrymander: A Formal Analysis (1993)
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DOI: 10.1023/A:1004986314885

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