Predicting the Institutional Effects of Term Limits

Daniel Franklin and Tor Westin

Public Choice, 1998, vol. 96, issue 3-4, 93 pages

Abstract: In this paper, the authors develop a model to predict the seniority turnover, and transition consequences of term limit reforms for any institution with a regularized procedure for rotating membership. With this model they can predict the number of members who will be serving in their last term at any given time once an institution reaches a stable state under term limit reforms. For example, the authors results show that for the U.S. Senate current term limit proposals will result in a substantial increase in the number of 'lame duck' members and a significant reduction in average seniority. They make no claims as to the public policy effects of term limit proposals. However, their model can be used to design a proposal that will maximize any benefits or minimize any public policy effects found to be associated with term limit reforms. Copyright 1998 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Date: 1998
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