Entry Barriers and Medical Board Funding Autonomy
Shirley Svorny () and
Public Choice, 1998, vol. 97, issue 1-2, 93-106
In this paper, the authors develop and test the hypothesis that institutional funding arrangements affect the extent to which public agencies are influenced by special interests. They test this hypothesis using data on state medical boards. In 1989, medical boards in twenty-one states received budget appropriations from their legislatures. The remaining boards operated independent of legislative control, financing their activities from fees and other revenues. The authors find that budgetary autonomy does influence agency decisions. The ability of physicians to restrict entry is enhanced where licensing boards are self-financed. Copyright 1998 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
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