Political Action Committee Spending and Senate Roll Call Voting
Peter Calcagno () and
Public Choice, 1998, vol. 97, issue 4, 569-85
This paper addresses how PAC spending affects the roll call voting behavior of U.S. senators. Using a theoretical framework which draws broadly on the voting literature, the authors develop models that explain senatorial voting behavior in a pre-PAC and post-PAC world. Testing both models, the authors find weak support for a Downs-Black view of voting participation in the first model. The second model supports the alteration of voting incentives resulting from PAC spending. They find that PACs have a positive effect on voting participation. The conjecture remains whether PACs change voting outcomes, but it is clear that they buy voting participation. Copyright 1998 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
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