When Are Stable Rights to Rents Bad?

Daniel Sutter

Public Choice, 1999, vol. 98, issue 1-2, 29-41

Abstract: Stable, enforceable property rights over resources normally furthers economic efficiency. The author argues that stable rights to government created rents and wealth transfers, by contrast, generate inefficiency. Secure rights to receive transfers increases rent-seekers' incentive to make political investments creating new transfers. The author demonstrates the point using a two period rent-seeking game. Contestable transfers reduce the probability of establishing a transfer program and aggregate rent-seeking expenditures. Strengthening transfer recipients' rights increases the difficulty of eliminating a transfer program. Copyright 1999 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Date: 1999
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://journals.kluweronline.com/issn/0048-5829/contents link to full text (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:98:y:1999:i:1-2:p:29-41

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... ce/journal/11127/PS2

Access Statistics for this article

Public Choice is currently edited by WIlliam F. Shughart II

More articles in Public Choice from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().