Setting the Agenda: Electoral Competition, Commitment of Policy, and Issue Salience

Amihai Glazer and Susanne Lohmann

Public Choice, 1999, vol. 99, issue 3-4, 377-94

Abstract: By committing policy, an incumbent in effect disowns an issue; when she maintains policy flexibility, the issue remains electorally salient. Electoral competition shapes political commitment decisions and collapses the multidimensional issue space into a low-dimensional space of electorally salient issues. Copyright 1999 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Date: 1999
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