The Reciprocal Relationship between State Defense Interest and Committee Representation in Congress

Thomas M Carsey and Barry Rundquist

Public Choice, 1999, vol. 99, issue 3-4, 455-63

Abstract: Does prior representation of a state on a Congressional defense committee lead to higher levels of per capita defense contracts, or do higher levels of prior per capita contract awards to a state increase its probability of being represented on a defense committee? To solve this puzzle, the authors estimate a cross-lagged three-equation model on data from all fifty states from 1963 to 1989 using maximum likelihood within LISREL. They find a substantial reciprocal but nonconfounding relationship between representation and the allocation of benefits for the House, but not for the Senate. Thus, for the House, this more appropriate model of distributive politics in Congress supports both the committee-induced benefits hypothesis and the recruitment hypothesis. Further, the paper elaborates on how this reciprocal relationship plays out over time. Copyright 1999 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Date: 1999
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
http://journals.kluweronline.com/issn/0048-5829/contents link to full text (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:99:y:1999:i:3-4:p:455-63

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... ce/journal/11127/PS2

Access Statistics for this article

Public Choice is currently edited by WIlliam F. Shughart II

More articles in Public Choice from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().