Entry, Prices, and Investment in Regulated Industries

Gianni De Fraja

Journal of Regulatory Economics, 1997, vol. 11, issue 3, 257-70

Abstract: The paper studies how the optimal regulatory policy is affected by the possibility of unregulated firms entering the market. In such cases, the regulator may prefer to limit price and cost reductions in the regulated incumbent. The extent to which this happens is shown to depend on the extent of the regulator's commitment: if it commits to a chosen policy, then the market outcome following entry is less competitive than it would be without commitment: price and production costs are both higher. We also show that, unlike the natural monopoly case, incentives for cost reducing investment are stronger when the regulatory policy has a short regulatory interval. Copyright 1997 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Date: 1997
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://journals.kluweronline.com/issn/0922-680X/contents link to full text (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:regeco:v:11:y:1997:i:3:p:257-70

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... on/journal/11149/PS2

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Regulatory Economics is currently edited by Menaham Spiegel

More articles in Journal of Regulatory Economics from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().