Medical Board Regulation of Physician Licensure: Is Excessive Malpractice Sanctioned?

Gary Fournier () and Melayne McInnes

Journal of Regulatory Economics, 1997, vol. 12, issue 2, 113-26

Abstract: This paper considers the deterrent effect that self-regulation has on a patient's propensity to sue under malpractice law. A model of tort-driven self regulation is developed and its implications are examined using data on the disciplinary actions of the Florida Medical Board and data on closed malpractice claims. Doctors who in 1987-1991 generated abnormal rates of malpractice claims had a higher rate of disciplinary actions in the following period 1992-1995. Significantly, the evidence suggests that the Board may also be more likely to discipline older physicians and non-certified practitioners, perhaps in response to special interests of industry members. Copyright 1997 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Date: 1997
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://journals.kluweronline.com/issn/0922-680X/contents link to full text (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:regeco:v:12:y:1997:i:2:p:113-26

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... on/journal/11149/PS2

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Regulatory Economics is currently edited by Menaham Spiegel

More articles in Journal of Regulatory Economics from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().