Market Share Quotas and Community Reinvestment

Sherrill Shaffer

Journal of Regulatory Economics, 1998, vol. 14, issue 1, 75-78

Abstract: This notes explores some theoretical implications of the U.S. Department of Justice's policy requiring lenders to seek as much market share in protected neighborhoods as elsewhere. In the asymmetric Cournot case, the high-cost lender in the protected neighborhood responds in the expected way, but the low-cost lender's response depends on the curvature of the demand function. For concave demand, the low-cost lender's output decisions run counter to those of the high-cost lender, undermining the policy's effectiveness and inefficiently shifting production in the protected market from the low-cost provider to the high-cost provider. Copyright 1998 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Date: 1998
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://journals.kluweronline.com/issn/0922-680X/contents link to full text (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:regeco:v:14:y:1998:i:1:p:75-78

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... on/journal/11149/PS2

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Regulatory Economics is currently edited by Menaham Spiegel

More articles in Journal of Regulatory Economics from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().