Reliability Management in Competitive Electricity Markets

Hung-Po Chao and Stephen C Peck

Journal of Regulatory Economics, 1998, vol. 14, issue 2, 189-200

Abstract: This paper examines market design issues for reliability management in competitive power markets. The institutional structure is characterized by a power exchange that conducts electricity market trading, a system operator that operates the electric power system, and a property right system for transmission pricing. In a competitive market, priority insurance fosters market information for determining efficient system reliability levels and induces system operators to maintain system security efficiently. A six-node network example is examined to illustrate the basic insights. Copyright 1998 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Date: 1998
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