Mergers in the Electric Utility Industry in a Deregulatory Environment
Karyl B Leggio and
Journal of Regulatory Economics, 2000, vol. 17, issue 1, 69-85
We document that the merger announcement returns are positive and significant for targets of acquiring electric utility industry firms, but are not as algebraically large as target returns documented in non-regulated industry merger announcements. Additionally, electric utility acquirer firms earn significant negative announcement returns when acquiring an electric utility. We find announcement returns for acquirers vary significantly based upon the timing of the merger announcement, with mergers announced after the Energy Policy Act of 1992 generating negative returns for acquirers. We also find a significant difference in the percentage change in aggregate entity value around the announcement date for diversifying mergers as compared to non-diversifying mergers, with diversifying merger announcements resulting in a decrease in aggregate entity value. Copyright 2000 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
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