More Is Less? Regulation in a Rent Seeking World

James F Dewey

Journal of Regulatory Economics, 2000, vol. 18, issue 2, 95-112

Abstract: Competition between two interest groups that engage in strategic lobbying to influence regulatory decisions is examined. It is shown that increases in gross surplus can be detrimental to all parties. The circumstances under which this might occur, along with several applications, including the decision to deregulate, are considered. It is also shown that a simultaneous increase in both groups' marginal lobbying costs benefits the low cost group and harms the high cost group. Copyright 2000 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Date: 2000
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