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Regulatory Restrictions on Vertical Integration and Control: The Competitive Impact of Gasoline Divorcement Policies

Michael G Vita

Journal of Regulatory Economics, 2000, vol. 18, issue 3, 217-33

Abstract: Gasoline "divorcement" regulations restrict the integration of gasoline refiners and retailers. Theoretically, vertical integration can harm competition, making it possible that divorcement policies could increase welfare; alternatively, these policies may reduce welfare by sacrificing efficiencies. This paper attempts to differentiate between these possibilities by estimating a reduced form equation for the real retail price of unleaded regular gasoline. I find that divorcement regulations raise the price of gasoline by about 2.6% per gallon, reducing consumers' surplus by over $100 million annually. This finding suggests that current proposals to further separate gasoline retailing from refining will be harmful to gasoline consumers. Copyright 2000 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Date: 2000
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