CEO Tenure, Board Composition, and Regulation

Rick Geddes and Hrishikesh Vinod

Journal of Regulatory Economics, 2002, vol. 21, issue 2, 217-35

Abstract: We examine the effect of deregulation in the 1970s and 1980s on the size of the board of directors, its composition, and on CEO tenure. Using panel data techniques, we consider those effects in the aggregate and for individual industries while controlling for firm size, CEO age, time and firm-specific effects. We conclude that deregulation significantly reduced the number of outsiders and the number of directors, but had little effect on the proportion of outsiders. We then examine the effect of deregulation on CEO tenure using hazard analysis. We find that deregulation increased the hazard rate, or reduced the tenure of CEOs. Copyright 2002 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Date: 2002
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