Rent Extraction by an Unregulated Essential Facility

Francois Boldron and Cyril Hariton ()

Journal of Regulatory Economics, 2002, vol. 22, issue 1, 85-95

Abstract: This paper shows that consumers may benefit when a regulator chooses not to regulate a final product in an industry characterized by an unregulated essential facility sold through non-linear tariffs. Two main reasons drive this result. First, the regulator maximizes social welfare and values the final good production more than the producer itself. Second, the regulator has access to an extra source of financing with the public funds. Therefore, the essential facility seller can ask more of the regulator than of the final good producer. Copyright 2002 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Date: 2002
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Working Paper: Rent Extraction by an Unregulated essential Facility (2000)
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