Regulatory Compliance with Costly and Uncertain Litigation

Mark Raymond ()

Journal of Regulatory Economics, 2004, vol. 26, issue 2, 165-176

Abstract: Harrington (1988) and more recent papers by Heyes and Rickman (1999), Livernois and McKenna (1999), and Heyes (1996) have attempted to explain how a relatively large fraction of firms are thought to be in compliance with environmental regulations despite the fact that expected penalties for these violations are deemed rather low. This paper offers an alternative explanation for the interesting paradox by incorporating costly and uncertain litigation.

Date: 2004
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