Strategic Firm Behavior Under Average-Revenue-Lagged Regulation

Kevin Currier

Journal of Regulatory Economics, 2005, vol. 27, issue 1, 67-79

Abstract: Price caps have been shown to have incentive properties superior to traditional rate of return regulation. Average-revenue-lagged regulation (ARL) is attractive in that steady-state prices are known to be efficient. We show that the ARL scheme can be manipulated by the firm so as to yield the unregulated global profit maximum. While tests exist that can provide the regulator with evidence of this strategic behavior, we also demonstrate that the unregulated global profit maximum will not be attainable if Laspeyres (L) regulation is employed. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, Inc. 2005

Keywords: price caps; average-revenue-lagged regulation; laspeyres regulation; strategic behavior (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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DOI: 10.1007/s11149-004-4419-8

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