Price Regulation and Public Service Obligations under International Arbitrage

Giorgio Matteucci () and Pierfrancesco Reverberi ()

Journal of Regulatory Economics, 2005, vol. 28, issue 1, 113 pages

Abstract: National regulation generates price differentials between countries stimulating arbitrage by international distributors. Harmed manufacturers counteract using vertical price-squeeze or non-price discrimination. We show that: (i) either under regulatory commitment or discretion, there are non-linear relationships between technology/market conditions and the first-mover’s pricing strategy; (ii) public service obligations on distributors allow regulators to manipulate parallel exports so as to improve national welfare; (iii) to prevent sabotage, regulation should provide manufacturers with adequate countervailing incentives; (iv) coordinating national agencies alleviates negative regulatory and market externalities. Therefore, static and dynamic efficiency concerns may arise within a regional exhaustion regime of intellectual property rights. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, Inc. 2005

Keywords: parallel trade; regulation; public service obligations; price and non-price discrimination (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s11149-005-2357-8 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:regeco:v:28:y:2005:i:1:p:91-113

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... on/journal/11149/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s11149-005-2357-8

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Regulatory Economics is currently edited by Menaham Spiegel

More articles in Journal of Regulatory Economics from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().