Mobile Termination: What is the “Right” Charge?*

Tommaso Valletti and George Houpis ()

Journal of Regulatory Economics, 2005, vol. 28, issue 3, 235-258

Abstract: The regulation of fixed-to-mobile (F2M) termination charges has become increasingly important in Europe, Australia, and New Zealand under the Calling Party Pays principle. In the absence of any regulation, mobile operators have an incentive to set F2M termination charges “too high”. We show that the setting of the optimal F2M termination charges depends on the significance of network externalities, the intensity of competition in the mobile sector, and the distribution of customer preferences. We also discuss the merits of possible remedies which are not very intrusive. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, Inc. 2005

Keywords: mobile telephony; network externality; termination charges; L41; L96 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (38)

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DOI: 10.1007/s11149-005-3955-1

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