Exceptions to the Rules: Variances from Regulatory Standards

Anthony Marino

Journal of Regulatory Economics, 2006, vol. 29, issue 2, 127-150

Abstract: In the major areas of regulation, standards can be violated through an appeal process set up as a part of the statutes. This paper formulates a model of the variance appeal process, characterizes the (perfect Bayesian) equilibria of this procedure and studies the welfare properties of these equilibria. I consider two versions of the decision rule used by the appeal board and suggest institutionally feasible alterations in these rules which can improve equilibrium welfare. I also study how obstructionist interest groups can affect the welfare performance of the decision rules. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, Inc. 2006

Keywords: Appeals; Variances; L5 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:kap:regeco:v:29:y:2006:i:2:p:127-150

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DOI: 10.1007/s11149-006-6032-5

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